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
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() CLACSTY as () DOWNGRADE TS to		OADR			uary 2,1970 lary 12,1970
,SUBJECT:	•	US-Chines	e Talks i	n Warsaw	
PARTICIPANTS:	Meeting 1 - (2/2/70 Mr	. Kreisberg	, Directo	r, EA/ACA	
	Meeting 2 -: 2/12/70 Mr	. Paul H. K	reisberg,	Director,E	EA/ACA
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had originally invited me out for a long lunch, but at the last minute I had to suggest we have a quick cafeteria lunch in the Department. Following the same general line of questioning as but much less intensively and doggedly (he apologized at one point for asking a question about the Warsaw talks; I told him I could not answer). He focussed more on the benefits to the Chinese and possibly the U.S. of "worrying" the Soviets through Sino-U.S. conversations in secret. Acknowledging some evidence of Soviet concern on this point, I professed not to understand the reason for it. I expressed incredulity that the Soviets could anticipate that the U.S. and Communist China were likely to move to reconcile their difficulties to such a degree that this in any respect could be threatening or dangerous to the USSR.

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